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PROPOSED SEC RULE 146: THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been estimated that the use of the private offering exemption provided
for in section 4(2)1 of the Securities Act of 1933 has proliferated to such an
extent that over one-half 2 of all the securities sold in the United States are privately placed. Nevertheless, while the exemption is one of the most widely used,
its parameters and availability are uncertain, so that "subjective and sometimes
unreconcilable standards have developed." 3 Accordingly, the SEC has promulgated proposed Rule 146, 4 which is expressly designed to provide greater assurance to the issuer in a private placement by providing more objective standards
to be used in determining the availability of the exemption. This Comment will
explore Rule 146 to see how effectively the stated goal will be achieved.
II. TnE PRE-Ralston ERA
The Securities Act of 1933 5 which was enacted to protect investors from
existing abuses5 in the sale of securities, effectuated its purpose by requiring
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970). This section was § 4(1) in the original Act, but was renumbered § 4(2) by the Security Act Amendments of 1964, Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-467, § 12, 78 Stat 565, 580, amending 15 US.C. § 77d(1) (1958). The exemption is officially known as "non-public offering," but alternatively referred to as "direct placement" or
"private offering." See, e.g., G. Goldberg, Preface to 2 S. Goldberg, Private Placements and
Restricted Securities at vii (1972) [hereinafter cited by volume as Goldberg]; Victor &
Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards For The Unwary, 45 Va. L. Rev. 869 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as Victor & Bedrick].
2. Preface to 2 Goldberg at vii. It is estimated that less than 35 of all debt securities
were privately placed from 1900 to 1930. Friend, Longstreet, Mendelson, Miller & Hess, Investment Banking and the New Issues Market 336-37 (1967). Since 1933, however, private
placements have accounted for more than one-third of all securities issued. See, e.g, 1 Loss,
Securities Regulation 689-91 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited by volume as Loss]; Steffen,
Private Placements Should Be Registered, 43 N.C.L. Rev. 548, 549 (1965) (dollar value of
private placements has exceeded that of registered securities in every year since 1942). Private offerings of long-term debt securities totalled more than $5 billion in each of the
last 10 years and in 1964 accounted for over 66% of all long-term debt security offerings.
Garrett, Private Placements, in Sale and Resale of Restricted Securities: Private Placements,
Rule 146, and Clarifications of Rule 144 at 81 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sale and Resale
of Restricted Securities]. See also 4 Loss 2662 (Supp. 1969). For an extensive discussion of
the advantages and disadvantages of private placements, see 1 Loss 689-96; Corey, Corporate
Financing by Direct Placement, 28 Harv. Bus. Rev. 67 (1950); Mendel, Institutional Investment through Private Placement of Corporate Securities, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 804 (1953).
3. Statement of former Chairman William J. Casey accompanying the release of Proposed Rule 146 (Nov. 28, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
79,108, at 82,396. See Harrison, Thirty-Eight Years Without Definition-The Private
Offer Exemption, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 417 (1971) (asserts that lack of clarity appears to be the
strength of the Act). See also note 59 infra.
4. Proposed Rule 146, 37 Fed. Reg. 26137 (1972).
5. Act of May 27, 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77bbbb (1970)).
6. The catastrophe which followed the market crash of 1929 was the catalyst for federal
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that all participants in a public offering "provide full and fair disclosure 7 of the
character of securities ... ."s Accordingly, section 50 of the Act prohibits the
use of any means of interstate commerce to sell or offer to sell securities unless
a registration statement has been filed with the SEC. However, this broad prohibition is tempered by the exemption of certain transactions, among them being
the private offering exemption which provides that the registration requirements
of section 5 shall not apply to "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering."' 0 The cryptic phrase "public offering" is not defined nor is the
legislative history of much assistance in determining when an offering is "not
public."-" Indeed, the House Report surmised only that the exemption would
permit "an issuer to make a specific or an isolated sale of its securities to a
regulation of the securities industry. Annual investor losses prior to 1929 were $1,700,000,000;
by 1932 the total losses on stocks and bonds amounted to $93 billion. 1 Loss 119-21; Note,
The Investment-Intent Dilemma in Secondary Transactions, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1043 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Investment-Intent Dilemma]. For an extensive treatment of proposed
federal legislation prior to the stock market crash, see 1 Loss 107-17.
7. Once Congress did decide to legislate, there were conflicting philosophies as to what
course the legislation should take. There were those who argued that any preventive law,
even of an injunctive nature, would not work and would impede honest business, and that
strict enforcement of penal laws would be a preferable approach. See Meeker, Preventive v.
Punitive Security Laws, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 318, 328 (1926). Nevertheless, Congress,
opted for preventive legislation implemented by "disclosure," strongly influenced by the
work of Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money (1914), which viewed "publicity" as a
remedy for social and industrial ills. See, e.g., 1 Loss 121-28; Landis, The Legislative History
of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 29, 30 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Landis]. One commentary noted that although the Act was designed to guarantee that
"the truth be told" and provide penalties for its disregard, it did not and could not control
the speculative craze of the American people nor make them discriminating investors.
Furthermore, the material required to be disclosed would be of little value to the Investor
who refrains from seeking professional advice, since the content and complexity would
prove incomprehensible. Thus, the Act would function only indirectly to protect the investor by preventing fraudulent transactions through disclosure and by putting more Information into the hands of investment advisors which would provide a more accurate appraisal of the worth of a security. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43
Yale L.J. 171, 171-72 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Douglas & Bates].
8. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); see 1 Loss 178, 184-86. In recommending passage of the Act, President Roosevelt stated that "[tihis proposal adds to the
ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' It puts the
burden of telling the whole truth on the seller." H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., istSess. 2
(1933). See also SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
819 (1960); Lynn v. Caraway, 252 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. La. 1966), aff'd, 379 F.2d
943 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 951 (1968); Landis 34-35.
9. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1970). The section provides, In
part: "(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly-(1) to make use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such
security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; ....
10. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
11. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 122 (1953); 1 Loss 653.
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particular person"'1 and that it would be available "where there is no practical
need for [section 5's] application or where the public benefits are too remote."'
Hence, it is not easy to determine just when a transaction is "private" rather
than "public." Moreover, even if the initial transaction were found to be private
since there was no need for registration or the public benefits were too remote,
the exemption would still fail if the purchaser executed a secondary transaction
evincing a distributive intent at the time of the initial offering, and thereby
became a statutory underwriter, 14 broadly defined as "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to ...distribution of any security . .,"15 The
12. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1933). This designation is too narrow in
view of the explicit determination of the draftsmen, in distinguishing between a public and
private offering, to provide an exemption for all sales other than "by an issuer, underwriter,
or dealer . . .replacing the concept of 'isolated transactions' theretofore traditional to blue
sky legislation." Landis 37; see 1 Loss 653.
13. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1933); see SEC v. Ralston Purina Co,
346 US. 119, 122 (1953).

14. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1970). The provision is designed
to prevent the redistribution of privately placed securities, since otherwise unregistered
securities would almost immediately filter into the public market. One commentator notes
that even with this provision, there is still the danger that if the requisite non-distributive
intent is present at the time of the original purchase, the subsequent resale is exempted regardless of the consequences to the public. Investment-Intent Dilemma 1045. See also
Ismels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 Va. L. Rev. 851, 852 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Israels]; Victor and Bedrick 871.
15. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 US.C. § 77b(11) (1970). Since distribution and
public offering are considered synonymous (H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41
(1934); Hlirtenstein v. Tenney, 252 F. Supp. 827, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)) an ordinary investor can become an underwriter if he acts as a conduit in the chain of transmission of
securities of the issuer. See Disclosure to Investors-A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative
Policies Under the '33 and '34 Acts 161-62 (1969) [hereinafter cited as The Wheat Report];
Orrick, Some Interpretative Problems Respecting the Registration Requirements Under the
Securities Act, 13 Bus. Law. 369, 370 (1958). Thus, the issuer has traditionally employed
devices such as the investment letter, see note 103 infra and accompanying text, and
legended certificates, see note 107 infra and accompanying text, to insure that the purchasers
had not taken with a view to distribution and thereby destroyed the exemption. It was
generally recognized, nevertheless, that such devices were neither conclusive nor determinative of the actual intent of the investor. See, e.g., Opinion of General Counsel, SEC Securities
Act Release No. 603, (Dec. 16, 1935), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 112,750, at 2,678-79; SEC
Securities Act Release No. 1,862 (Dec. 14, 1938), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 1,533, at
2,203 (a state of mind can be measured only by evidentiary factors). Regardless of such
warnings, fairly loose practices developed concerning the precautionary devices. It was
generally assumed that reliance could safely be placed on the representations of the investor and that even if he "did sell, even comparatively soon the consequences were not
likely to be serious or difficult to cope with." Israels 853. These assumptions were exploded
in Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3,825 (Aug. 12, 1957),
[1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. I976,539, at 80,127. There, since the
issuance of common stock was impractical because of the company's poor financial record,
the company privately placed $3,000,000 worth of debentures, immediately convertible into
common stock, with 27 persons including four broker-dealers. Each routinely signed the
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issuer must, therefore, not only comply with the standards delineated by the
SEC and the courts in the initial offering, but he must further be assured that
the purchaser has not taken with a distributive intent. 10 Most importantly, although guidance is scarce,' 7 the issuer must act with the realization that failure
to comply with either facet of the exemption can be punished criminally if the
violation is willful. Even if the violation is unintentional, the issuer is subject
to an injunction 9 and rescission or damages. 20 Accordingly, the SEC and the
standard investment letter. By closing date, however, over one-third of the debentures had
already been resold to interested investors. A similar procedure was repeated in 1956. The

SEC refused to exempt the transactions, and asserted that "[a]n issuer may not establish
a claim to an exemption ... merely by collecting so-called 'investment representations'
if in fact a distribution ... occurs." Id. at 80,131.
16. Furthermore, a basis for the exemption could not be established merely by "[hiolding
for the six months' capital gains period of the tax statutes," until the market rose or fell, or
for a year. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3,825 (Aug. 12,
1957) [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 76,539, at 80,132; see Gilligan,
Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959); Dempsey
& Co., 38 S.E.C. 371, 376 (1958); Orrick, Non-Public Offerings of Corporate SecuritiesLimitations on the Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act, 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 16
(1959); cf. United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Professor
Loss points out that if taken as literally true that any vague intent to resell on change of
market conditions destroys the non-distributive intent, "it is difficult to see how a resale
could ever be made with safety except in the event of death, bankruptcy or other personal
disaster." 1 Loss 671. Recently, the SEC promulgated Securities Act Rule 144, effective
April 15, 1972, which, inter alia, modified the investment intent requirement by redefining
underwriter, provided that current information concerning the issuer is available, the
restricted securities have been held for a specified length of time, the securities sold after the
passage of the specified holding period do not exceed a given percentage, and the sale takes
place as a brokerage transaction in a specified manner. 37 Fed. Reg. 597-99 (1972). For
extensive discussion of Rule 144, see SEC Securities Act Release No. 5,223 (Jan. 11, 1972),
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1178,487, at 81,049-64; SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5,087 (Sept. 22, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 11 77,909, at 80,025-28; 2 Goldberg ch. 8. See also The Wheat Report 160-247 for a
discussion of the law prior to Rule 144.
17. Obtaining advice of counsel will not insure the availability of the exemption and Is
no defense to an action brought for failure to register the securities. Hayden Lynch & Co.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7,935 (Aug. 10, 1966), [1966-1967 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,402, at 82,712-20; The Wheat Report 177,
18. Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970), provides in part: "Any person
who willfully violates any of the provisions of this subchapter . . . shall upon conviction be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."
19. Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970), provides in part: "(b)
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to engage
in any acts or practices which consitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this
subchapter ... it may in its discretion, bring an action ... to enjoin such acts or practices,
and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall
be granted without bond." The application of this injunctive power depends on whether
"there is a reasonable expectation that the defendants will thwart the policy of the Act by
engaging in activities proscribed thereby." SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249 (2d Cir.
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courts have attempted to establish the parameters of the private offering exempm2
tion.
The initial attempt at administrative construction led to the assumption that
the exemption would be available if the offering were to less than a substantial
number. This misconception had a basis in fact. In 1933, the Federal Trade
Commission, which administered the Act prior to the creation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 2 stated in a release that an offering would be considered public if made to a "substantial number."23 Moreover, in 1935, the
Securities and Exchange Commission proffered that "[the opinion has been
previously expressed by this office that an offering of securities to an insubstantial
number of persons... under ordinary circumstances an offering to not more than
approximately twenty-five persons is not an offering to a substantial number
and presumably does not involve a public offering."2 4 This presumption, however,
1959). See also SEC v. Los Angelos Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830, 876
(S.D. Cal.), aff'd and modified on other grounds, 285 Fad 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 919 (1961); SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge ConsoL Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248,
262 (D. Utah 1958).
20. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970) provides in part: "Any person
who-() offers or sells a security in violation of § 77e of this title ... shall be liable to the
person purchasing such security from him, who may sue . . . to recover the consideration
paid for such security with interest thereon, ...
upon the tender of such security, or for
damages if he no longer owns the security."
21. See Garfield v. Strain, 320 F2d 116, 119 (10th Cir. 1963); Woodward v. Wright,
266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th Cir. 1959); Dodd, Amending the Securities Act-The American Bar
Association Committee's Proposals, 45 Yale L.J. 199, 205 (1935); Douglas & Bates 185.
22. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970)).
23. FTC Securities Act Release No. 97 (Dec. 28, 1933), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 1,025,
at 2,054.
24. Opinion of General Counsel, SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935),
1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f1 2,740, at 2,676 [hereinafter cited as Release 285]. While the
Commission insisted that a quantitative test, standing alone, could not be considered grounds
for a private offering exemption, the assumption, nevertheless, retained vitality. See Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D.Pa. 1951), where the court, in finding a private
offering, emphasized that the offering was limited to a "small number of participants." Id.
at 977. (The case is criticized in 1 Loss 655 n.47, and 2 Goldberg § 2.3(c)(2)). The
Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), conclusively held that the
statute would seem to apply "whether to few or many." Id. at 125 (footnote omitted). See
SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830, 870 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd
and modified on other grounds, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919
(1961); Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D. Colo. 1959); Nash v. Lynde, [1929]
A.C. 158, 169.
However, the Ralston Court softened its rejection of the numerical test by stating that
"nothing prevents the commission, in enforcing the statute, from using some kind of
numerical test in deciding when to investigate particular exemption clais.Y 346 U.S. at
125. This dictum led to the assumption that the less than 25 offerees opinion enunciated by
the Commission was still a viable criterion for gauging the existence of the exemption. For
example, in conjunction with the 1954 Security Act Amendments, the House Committee

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

was tempered by the same release which noted that the existence of the private
offering exemption was essentially a question of fact and that "all surrounding
circumstances" must be considered in determining its availability. 2 The release
delineated a number of evidentiary factors of variant importance to be used in
this determination. It dearly established, for example, that it was the number of
offerees which would be considered-not the number of actual purchasers, " and
that the exemption would fail if the issuer could not affirmatively prove the

actual number of offerees. 27 Thus, in Corporation Trust Co. v. Logan,28 where

an offering of open-ended voting trust certificates provided that "[a] ny present
or future holder of Class 'B' Stock of the Corporation .. .may at any time
become a party to this Agreement, as fully as though such holder had executed
this Agreement in the first instance," 29 the court held that the offering was

public, since "the offer palpably runs to thousands of persons."8 0

The Commission also regarded as significant the relationship between the
report stated that the amount of the offering was irrelevant provided that the offering was
private, "which the Commission by rule of thumb construes as being to no more than some
25 offerees." H.R. Rep. No. 1542, 83 Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1954); see Collier v. Mikel Drilling
Co., 183 F. Supp. 104, 111-12 (D. Minn. 1958); 1 Loss 661; Orrick, Some Observations on
the Administration of the Securities Laws, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 25, 33 (1957). However, this
assumption was again restrained in Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 467 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959), and Dempsey & Co., 38 S.E.C. 371, 376 (1958). In both
cases, although the exemptions were clearly lost on other grounds, the courts explicitly
rejected the contention that, even after Ralston, a quantitative test was a viable contention.
See 4 Loss 2644 (Supp. 1969) ; D.F. Bernheimer & Co., 41 S.E.C. 358, 363 (1963) ; Advanced
Research Associates, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 579, 587-91 (1963); SEC Securities Act Release No.
4,552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f]2,771, at 2,683-84 [hereinafter dted as
Release 4,552]. Nevertheless, courts have continued to consider the number of offerees as a
relevant factor in determining the existence of the private offering exemption. See also
Hirtenstein v. Tenney, 252 F. Supp. 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Value Line Fund, Inc. v.
Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 91,523, at 94,970 n.14
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
25. See Release 285, at 2,676; SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 n.12 (1953);
Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th Cir. 1959); Release 4,552, at 2,683.
26. Release 285, at 2,676. The Commission noted that an "offer" was not limited to
formal proposals in an attempt to procure firm commitments, but included any attempt
to dispose of the security; thus, any preliminary conversations with prospective purchasers
might constitute a public offering. Id. Release 4,552, at 2,684 ("general solicitations" constitute an offer); 1 Loss 655-56.
27. In Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898 (D. Colo. 1959), the court noted that although
the issuer affirmatively proved there were only 13 actual purchasers, it was still a public
offering since it was incumbent on the issuer to prove the actual number of offerees; this not
having been done, "they must suffer the consequences." Id. at 904. See, e.g., Henderson v.
Hayden, Stone Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f1 93,504, at
92,436-38 (5th Cir. 1972); Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Colo. 1965).
28. 52 F. Supp. 999 (D. Del. 1943).
29. Id. at 1001. Voting trust certificates are within the Act's broad definition of securities.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
30. 52 F. Supp. at 1002.
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issuer and the offerees prior to the offering. "Thus, an offering to the members
of a class who should have special knowledge of the issuer is less likely to be
a public offering than is an offering to the members of a class of the same size
who do not have this advantage." 3' Although the underlying rationale of this
distinction is that such a class is more likely to have greater knowledge of the
business affairs of the offeree, the fact that the transaction was between "friends
and acquaintances" has been given independent significance by the courts.32
Also considered significant factors were the size of the offering " 3 and the
number of units offered,3 4 since if the offering were large or the units were in
small denominations, there would be an increased probability of public distribution. Lastly, since it was believed that private offerings would be limited to
31. Release 285, at 2,677; Release 4,552, at 2,683. Thus, if the offerees are strangers prior
to the transaction, an implication is raised against the availability of the exemption. See Hill
York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 688 (5th Cir. 1971); Chapman
v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969); 2 Goldberg § 4.1(d). The manner of selecting the
offerees is significant. An offering to a comparatively large class, determined by some preexisting standard, would more likely be private than the same offering to an even smaller
class selected at random or without an ostensible standard. See Hill York Corp. v. American
Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 688 (5th Cir. 1971).
32. In Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975, 977 (W.D. Pa. 1951), the court noted
that the transaction was a "dose-knit arrangement among friends and acquaintances on a
purely personal basis. .. ." Id.; accord, Garfield v. Strain, 320 F.2d 116, 119 (10th Cir.
1963); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th Cir. 1959). See also Mulford, Private
Placements and Intrastate Offerings of Securities, 13 Bus. Law. 297, 300-01 (1958). However,

it should not be assumed that a dose relationship will in and of itself guarantee the exemption. In Republic Cement Corp., 38 S.E.C. 19, 26 (1957), the Commission held the exemption
not available even though the offerees were friends and acquaintances, since they were a
diverse group, and had no special means of informing themselves about the issuer. Factors

such as scattered location tend to negate the inference of a dose relationship (Edwards v.
United States, 374 F.2d 24, 25 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 US. 850 (1967)), and
diverse occupations can be indicative of an offering open to the general public (Chapman v.
Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 160 (6th Cir. 1969)).
33. Release 285, at 2,677; Release 4,552, at 2683. See also Shimer v. Webster, 225 A.2d
880, 884 (D.C. App. 1967); Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No.
3,825 (Aug. 12, 1957), [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. I9 76,539, at
80,127-31.
34. Release 285, at 2,677. The Commission believed that the exemption was intended to
be applied chiefly to small offerings, which by their nature are less likely to be public. However, the dollar value of the offering as a significant factor was deemphasized in a later
release which distinguished the institutional and non-institutional investor, the dollar value
being tangentially relevant only to the latter category. Release 4,552, at 2,684. The courts
likewise have ignored the size of the offering. See United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 US.
383 (1956) ($4,000,000); Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,523, at 94,953 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ($3,246,000); Fuller v. Dilbert,
244 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Righter v. Dilbert, 358 F.2d
305 (2d Cir. 1966) ($1,000,000). On the other hand, a quantitatively small offering does not
guarantee that it is private. See 2 Goldberg § 2.2(b). But see Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F.
Supp. 975, 978 (W.D. Pa. 1951); 1 Loss 655 n.47.
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situations "wherein the issuer desires to consummate a few transactions with
particular persons,"8 5 the Commission stated that transactions by direct negotiations are more likely to be non-public,80 and public advertising would be incompatible with the claim of a private offering.87
In theory, at least, the "surrounding circumstances" test provided flexible and
objective standards for determining the existence of the exemption.88 However,
as the test evolved, the predominant factors examined by the courts were the
number of offerees 8 and their relationship to the issuer,40 and neither were
sufficiently clear to give any assurance to the issuer desiring to transact a private
offering. For example, in SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co.,41 the SEC sought an
injunction against the offering of the defendant company, which had entered into
an agreement to purchase all the assets of Golden West Consolidated Mines.
While the agreement was pending, the defendant company solicited pledge loan
agreements from the 530 existing stockholders of both companies for the purpose
of completing the purchase. 42 The defendant contended that "public" meant "an
offer to everyone," and since the present offer was limited to existing shareholders, it was a private rather than a public offering. 48 The court rejected the
contention, and stated that:
Such an offering, though not open to everyone who may choose to apply, is none the
less 'public' in character, for the means used to select the particular individuals ...
bear no sensible relation to the purposes for which the selection is made.44
While the "sensible relation" test developed by the court in Sunbeam provided
protection for the offerees in the sense that the issuer could not establish arbitrarily a "class" of offerees in order to make the offering private, on closer analysis it was clear that the protection was not broad enough. 46 Within the case
itself, for example, it was certainly arguable that existing stockholders bore a
"sensible relation" to the purpose for which the selection was made; perhaps the
court would have found a private offering if the offering bad been limited to only
stockholders of the existing company. Nevertheless, this relationship would by
no means indicate that the offerees were such that they did not need the dis35. Release 285, at 2,677.
36. Id.
37. Release 4,552, at 2,685. While public advertising defeats the claim of the exemption,
lack of it does not insure its availability. See, e.g., Republic Cement Corp., 38 S.E.C. 19,

26 (1957).
38. The criteria delineated are objective in that the intent of the issuer Is Irrevelant. If
the requisite relationship was lacking or public advertising was employed in disseminating
the information, then the claim would be defeated regardless of the intent of the Issuer. See
Investment-Intent Dilemma 1048.
39. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
40. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
41. 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938).
42. Id. at 700.
43. Id. at 701.
44. Id.
45. See Investment-Intent Dilemma 1049.
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closure protection of the Act. Finally, in 1953, the Supreme Court attempted to
shed light on the elements necessary to constitute a private offering in SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co. 46
11.

Ralston Purina: AccEss

AND

FENDING FOR THmmSELWES

Ralston Purina Company had nearly 7,000 employees scattered throughout the
United States and Canada 47 Consistent with the company's policy of encouraging
stock ownership among its employees, between 1947 and 1951, the company
issued nearly $2,000,000 worth of unregistered securities48 until enjoined by the
SEC. While admitting that an offering made indiscriminately to all employees
would be a public offering, the company contended that the present offering was
within the confines of the exemption since it was made solely to "key employees," 49 among them being those with duties of artist, foreman, copywriter, electrician, clerk, production trainee and veterinarian. The Court rejected the
company's classification of key employees,50 and held that the private offering
exemption should be interpreted in light of the statutory purpose of the Act-the
protection of investors through the disclosure of all information necessary for an
informed investment decision.
Since exempt transactions are those as to which "there is no practical need for
[the bill's] application," the applicability of § 4(l) [now § 4(2)] should turn on
whether the particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act. An
offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction
"not involving any public offering." 51

The Court concluded that since the exemption "turns on the knowledge of the
offerees," 52 they must be "shown
to have access to the kind of information which
53
registration would disclose."
46. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
47. Id. at 120-21. The Court noted that the offerees "lived in over fifty widely separated
communities." Id. at 121. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
48. 346 U.S. at 121.
49. Id. Key employees meant those within the organization that influenced and advised
others, had special responsibilities, were sympathetic to management, and were likely to be
promoted. Id. at 122.
50. Id. at 126-27. Thus, corporate employees, as a class, would not be deprived of the protection of the Act in the absence of a position giving them access to the same information
that registration would disclose. In 1934 a legislative proposal to this effect was defeated.
H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934). The Commission had noted that an
offering to a class with special knowledge would be less likely to be public, particularly a
class of high executive officers. Release 285, at 2,677. See also Release 4,552, at 2,684. Once
a special relationship has been established, the offering may be made to a larger group. See
1 Loss 657-59.
51. 346 U.S. at 125, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933); see Gmigan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 US. 896 (1959).
52. 346 US. at 126.
53. Id. at 127. Some confusion has been engendered by the fact that the Court mentioned
both the "registration statement" and "registration" in its discussion of the "access" require-
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While presumably the evidentiary factors previously delineated by the Commission are still significant, 4 the "needs test" enunciated in the Ralston decision
has become the fundamental standard for determining the availability of the
exemption. Under this test, there dearly can be no broad classification of offerees,
such as employees55 or stockholders," since while some of them may be able to
"fend for themselves," others may need the protection afforded by the Act. However, the "needs test" belies easy application, since the Court introduced, but left
undefined, the concepts of "access" and "fending for themselves. 5' 7 It is not
clear, for example, whether the position of the offerees was a necessary element
ment. See id. at 125-27. However, the registration statement provides more extensive Information than would be provided if the securities were registered. Compare Schedule A, 15
U.S.C. § 77aa (1970), with the statutory prospectus, § 10(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(1)
(1970), which provides that some information contained in Schedule A need not be included.
This confusion has not been clarified in subsequent releases. See, e.g., Silver Shield Mining
& Milling Co., 39 S.E.C. 766, 769 (1960) (registration statement) ; Cameron Indus. Inc., 39
S.E.C. 540, 546 (1959) (prospectus). Nor have the courts been consistent in deciding what
degree of information is required. See, e.g., Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1054
(2d Cir. 1969) (registration); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675,
678 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967) (Schedule A). See also Sargent, Private
Offering Exemption, 21 Bus. Law. 118, 119-20 (1965), wherein the author contends that
"no matter what information an issuer may supply to any investor, absent registration, It
could not possibly be comparable to that which comes out of the registration process." Id.
at 120.
54. See Patton, The Private Offering: A Simplified Analysis of the Initial Placement,
27 Bus. Law. 1089 (1972), wherein Patton contends that the availability of the exemption
is established by proof that the offerees are sophisticated, have access to the information,
and have taken with the proper investment intent. However, the courts have mistakenly
applied the "surrounding circumstances" test directly to the availability of the exemption
rather than as evidentiary factors with the result being "uncertainty, complexity, and Irrationality where a meticulous, reasoned approach is required." Id. at 1104. Patton recommends that the Commission rescind Release 285 since it has been a source of confusion
rather than clarification. Id. at 1105.
55. The decision turned on the fact that the employees were not shown to have access
to the kind of information which registration would disclose. "The obvious opportunities
for pressure and imposition make it advisable that they be entitled to compliance with § 5."
346 U.S. at 127.
56. The number of offerees permissible in stockholder offerings has generally been large,
since they are members of a particular class. However, the relationship is not a substitute
for furnishing the requisite information, unless there is a correlation between the position
and access to the information. 2 Goldberg § 4.2(b); see SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co.,
95 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1938) (offering to existing stockholders held public). The lack of
correlation was evident in Robinette & Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 7,386 (Aug. 11,
1964), [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 77,118, at 82,057, where the
offerees, although existing stockholders, had no special relationship to the issuer, lacked
sophistication, and were "woefully lacking in knowledge of the issuer's affairs." Id. at 82,058.
57. See Israels 852-53. The statute was challenged as unconstitutionally vague In United
States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 952 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984 (1962). The
court conceded that the statute might have previously been challenged, but the judicial
gloss placed on the legislation in Ralston Purina cured any defect. 294 F.2d at 952.
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of access, or whether offerees could "fend for themselves" independently of access
because of their bargaining power and sophisticated business experience. Furthermore, it was not clear whether the access requirement imposed a duty to actively
disclose the information, or merely make it available.08 Subsequent courts, therefore, have attempted to establish the meaning as well as relationship of these
terms.59
The fact that the Ralston standards were not clearly understood was demonstrated in Garfield v. StrainP There, an experienced geologist, in order to raise
money for the drilling of a test well, undertook to sell fractional interests in the
oil and gas leases. Garfield, who admitted that he was "not even an ignoramus
in matters pertaining to the oil business,"'61 entered into a contract to purchase
a one-half interest in the leases, and the issuer sent him geological maps and
other data pertaining to the leases. When the proposed test well was subsequently
found to be dry, Garfield refused to pay the contract price since he contended
the offering was public. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it was a
private offering, since the defendant had wide business experience, including
ownership of oil stocks, and "' [t]he close relationship and past dealings between
plaintiffs and ... the defendant, refutes a claim that there was a public offering
involved

. ...

62

Although the court expressed allegiance to the Ralston decision, the reasoning
used by the court seems antithetical. It was expressly shown that the offeree was
unsophisticated and that the information supplied was both unintelligible to the
offeree and certainly not as extensive or of a kind that would be supplied if
registration were required. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the offeree
was "in a class not needing the protection of the Act."03 However, since the
exemption turns on the knowledge of the offerees, it is anomalous that a "close
relationship," absent either sophistication or access, could presumptively be a
substitute for the protection that registration provides.64
The first analysis of the Ralston "access" standard was supplied by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC. 8 There, Gilligan, Will
& Co., which had been suspended from membership in the National Association
58. Compare Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 9 91,523, at 94,953, 94,970 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), with Lively v. Hlrschfield, 440 F.2d
631 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hall, 298 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Conn. 1969).

59. See generally Harrison, Thirty-Eight Years Without Definition-The Private Offering
Exemption, 24 Ark. L. Rev. 417 (1971); Orrick, Some Observations on the Administration
of the Securities Laws, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 25 (1957) ; Victor & Bedrick 869.
60. 320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963).
61. Id. at 119 n,3.
62. Id. at 119.
63. Id.
64. Cf. Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th Cir. 1959) (on-sight inspection
and apparent "sophisticated discernment" satisfied the requirements of the Act); Vicioso
v. Watson, 325 F. Supp. 1071 (D. Cal. 1971) (offering to two doctors who had no prior
experience in oilspeculation). See also Patton, The Private Offering: A Simplified Analysis
of the Initial Placement, 27 Bus. Law. 1089, 1090-92 (1972).
65. 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
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of Securities Dealers, Inc., for five days because of its participation in distributing
the shares of Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., petitioned for review of the suspension, claiming, inter alia, that the offering was private0 c Although there had
been a stipulation of fact that they "'were not supplied with material information... nor were the purchasers in such a relation to the issuer as to have access
to such information,' "67 the company argued that the definition of Ralston was
not exclusive, and that since there were only four actual purchasers, the offering
was private. The court rejected the argument that a quantitative limit could
determine the existence of the exemption, and stated that "the additional stipulated facts . . . concedes the very proposition of which the petitioners had to
establish the negative ..
688...The court held that the standard in determining
the existence of the claimed exemption was "whether the persons to whom the
offering is made are in such a position with respect to the issuer that they either
actually have such information as a registration [sic] would have disclosed, or
have access to such information."69
Although the Ralston decision focused only on whether the offerees had access,
the inclusion of the "actual possession" classification by the court in Gilligan,
was a justified interpretation since the exemption turns on the knowledge of the
offerees. 0 This access-knowledge distinction was reiterated in SEC v. Tax Service, Inc.,71 where the company made the offering to purchasers of its tax calculators and of its publications. The court noted that since the exemption turns
on the knowledge of the offerees, where they have "neither knowledge of nor
'access to the kind of information which registration would disclose,' the offerees
are in need of the protection of the Act .... ,,72
Thus, the "access" standard could be satisfied where the offerees are shown
either to actually have the requisite information, 7 or have access to it. However,
66. Id. at 463, 467.
67. Id. at 466.
68. Id.
69. Id. But see Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Colo. 1969), wherein
the court reasoned that although the Ralston decision appeared to make registration optional,
"the seller must show that all offerees are given the information which a registration state-

ment would make available or that they did not need this protection." Id. at 265. Although
the court found a public offering due to failure of proof on the number of offerees, the court

read the Ralston standards in such a way that a showing of either access or, in the alternative, sophistication, would justify the claimed exemption. Id.; accord, Value Line Fund,
Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,523, at 94,953

(S.D.N.Y. 1965). Contra, Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d
680, 690 (5th Cir. 1971).
70. See 2 Goldberg § 2.4(c) (2).
71. 357 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1966).
72. Id. at 144.
73. See Dempsey & Co., 38 S.E.C. 371, 375 (1958), where the court emphasized that
the offerees were neither in a position to have access, nor did they receive the requisite
information. See also Hazel Bishop Inc., 40 S.E.C. 718, 730 (1961) ; Crowell-Colfier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3,825 (Aug. 12, 1957), [1957-1961 Transfer Binder]
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it is not clear what position one would have to occupy to have access. Moreover,
simply furnishing the offerees with the requisite information would not guarantee
that the offering was private. The Commission noted that " [s] uch a construction
would give each issuer the choice of registering or making its own voluntary disclosures without regard to the standards and sanctions of the Act."14
Assuming that one had the requisite position, and had either actual possession
of the information or at least potential access, it was still questionable whether
the "fending for themselves" language of RalstonT implied a standard separate
and distinct from access.7' For example, could a class of offerees, because of their
sophisticated business experience and bargaining power enabling them to demand
and receive all the information for an informed investment decision, be judged
capable of "fending for themselves," independently of any prior relationship or a
determination of access? Furthermore, it was unclear whether a showing that the
information was indeed available, although not actually transmitted, would
justify the claimed private offering exemption.
These questions were explored in Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus." There,
five mutual funds purchased more than $3,000,000 worth of unregistered securities. When approximately one year later the market price of the securities collapsed, the purchasers brought a rescission action, claiming that they lacked a
position giving access to the information and had not, in the alternative, actually
received it, and were therefore incapable of making an informed investment
decision.78 The court found that the offering was private, and based its decision
on the sophistication of the offerees, mature businessmen who had participated in
an arm's length transaction. The court stated that they were sophisticated enough
to demand and had enough leverage to receive all the information necessary.10
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 76,539, at 80,127-30; cf. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d
137, 159 (5th Cir. 1972).
74. Release 4,552, at 2,684. Goldberg asserts that the statement logically means that a

voluntary furnishing of information will not, in and of itself, automatically make the
exemption available. "However, when the other elements of a private placement have
been satisfied, the offerees must then have access to, or be supplied with, the required
information.' 2 Goldberg § 2.4(c) (1). But see text accompanying note 122 infra.
75. 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
76. See Israels 852-53.
77. [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 91,523, at 94,953 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
78. Id. at 94,955. During the course of negotiations, Value Line informed the issuer that
their agents were in possession of all public information. Relying on this representation, the
issuer supplied no information. Id.
79. Id. at 94,970; accord, Fuller v. Dilbert, 244 F. Supp. 196, 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. Righter v. Dilbert, 358 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1966). There, seasoned
investment bankers, who had agreed to act as guarantors of a private placement, brought a
contract rescission action claiming that there had been oral misrepresentations concerning
the financial condition of the company. The court affirmed the contract, finding it incredible
that sophisticated investors, if in fact such a representation had been made, would have
participated in the transaction without requiring that the representations be reduced to

writing.
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The fact that they failed to investigate properly "cannot be twisted into any
valid claim that [they] did not have access to information and were not in a
position to fend for themselves." 80
While the offerees in Value Line were institutional investors, which have
always been viewed favorably in private placements,81 the decision stands for
the proposition that if the offerees are a class which can "fend for themselves"
then nothing else need be shown to justify the claimed exemption.
However, the Value Line analysis is contrary to that in Gilligan, Will & Co.,
wherein it was noted that the Ralston language "does not support the view that
the availability of an exemption depends on the sophistication of the offerees or
buyers, rather than their possession of, or access to, information,"8 2 and was
not applied to individual investors in United States v. Custer Channel Wing
Corp.83 There, the issuer contended that although none of the purchasers of the
stock had access to the information, the exemption was still available since all
the purchasers were mature businessmen and sophisticated investors, and thus
could fend for themselves.s 4 The court rejected the contention and cited Ralston
for the proposition that "'sophistication' is not a substitute for 'access to the
kind of information which registration would disclose.' "8,
80. [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 91,523, at 94,970 (S.D.N.Y.
1956). The court noted, in dictum, that a contrary conclusion would limit the availability
of the private offering exemption to only key employees of the issuer who would possess or
have access to the requisite information. Id.
81. The Commission has shown a clear preference for institutional investors in private
placements, since they are clearly a class which is highly sophisticated and able to fend for
themselves. Indeed, a member of the original commission which formulated the Act noted that
"it]he sale of an issue of securities to insurance companies or to a limited group of experienced investors, was certainly not a matter of concern to the federal government."
Landis 37; accord, Orrick, Non-Public Offerings of Corporate Securities-Limitations on
the Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act, 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1959); Victor
& Bedrick 871-72. Nevertheless, while the institutional investor sometimes demands more Information than even the SEC, and offerings to them are rarely overturned, they are still
subject to the criteria delineated in Ralston. See Gilligan, Will & Co., 38 S.E.C. 388, 393
(1958), aff'd, Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 896 (1959). Given this anomaly, many authorities have suggested that the Commission unequivocally provide that all sales to banks, insurance companies, and other
institutional investors constitute exempt transactions under section 4(2) of the Act. See
Victor & Bedrick 883. See also ALl Fed. Sec. Code § 242 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
82. 38 S.E.C. 388, 393 (1958), aff'd, Gilhigan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959); see note 67 supra and accompanying text.
83. 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967).
84. Id. at 678; see Collier v. Mikel Drilling Co., 183 F. Supp. 104, 112 (D. Minn. 1958)
(investment experience in the specialized area of fractional shares in oil leases equivalent to
being able to fend for themselves). However, prior investment experience, even in connection
with previous private placements, does not replace the right to receive the requisite information.
85. 376 F.2d at 678. In Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680
(5th Cir. 1971), the court stated that "[olbviously if the plaintiffs did not possess the
information requisite for a registration statement, they could not bring their sophisticated
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Finally, in Lively v. HirschJdd,6 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals coalesced the concepts of "access" and "fending for themselves." There, the defendant sold some 8,000 shares from 1967 through 1968. One of the plaintiffs,
an airline pilot with considerable business experience, testified that he was told
the bare essentials of the corporate structure, and since he had asked for no
further information, it could not be said that any was withheld. Furthermore,
he made the purchase only after "considered business judgmenL" 87 The court
held that the offering was public, and stated that "[t]he Supreme Court in its
description of a possible 'private' group in Ralston Purina includes only persons
of exceptional business experience [sophisticated], and 'a position where they
have regular access to all the information and records .... ",8
Thus, the standards of "access" and "fending for themselves" have proved
evasive, and neither their meaning nor their relation to each other have been
sufficiently clarified. Under the access standard, the issuer must determine
whether the offeree is in such a position that he has access to the information,
or in the alternative, whether information should be supplied." Arguably, the
issuer can presume that the offeree has access in at least two situations. On the
one hand, where the offeree has a "special relationship," which is at least more
than being a mere employee or stockholder, it can be presumed that by virtue
of his corporate position he has access to the information. However, since this
special relationship has not been objectively defined, and the exemption is to be
strictly construed, reliance on this presumption, except in the dearest of cases,
would be ill-advised, since the relationship might not support the presumption.
On the other hand, the presumption that the offeree has access to the information
has rarely been questioned when the offeree is an institutional investor, since
"[t]hey are quite able to satisfy themselves as to what they are getting into
before putting their money down."' 9 In other situations, the issuer must employ
the alternative, a determination of whether the information should be supplied,
and be capable of showing that the offerees actually have the information necessary for an informed investment decision. Merely opening the corporate books
or relying on the fact that the offerees desired no further information will not
meet this burden of proof. Moreover, voluntarily supplying the information will
not guarantee the exemption, since there must be some relationship between the
parties prior to making the offering. Thus, it is clear that the difficulty is most
acute when dealing with individual offerees, since the issuer must subjectively
knowledge of business affairs to bear in deciding whether or not to invest ...

."

Id. at

690. See United States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Conn. 1969) (no investor is
per se sophisticated and can fend for himself only if he has access to the information).
One author notes that while there is a wide split of authority on the significance of
sophistication, the lack of it places a heavier burden on the issuer to supply all the required
information. 2 Goldberg § 4.1(b).
86. 440 F.2d 631 (loth Cir. 1971).
87. Id. at 632.
88. Id. at 633; see 1971 Duke L.J. 1017, 1020-23.
89. See notes 65-70 supra and accompanying text.
90. Victor & Bedrick 872.
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determine both how much information is necessary and whether the relationship
is such as to justify the claim of the exemption.
The "fending for themselves" standard, which is synonymous with "sophistication," has proved no less confusing. The difficulty does not present itself when
the offeree is an institutional investor, since, as with access, it can safely be presumed "sophisticated."' l Apart from institutional investors, however, one cannot
be sure of what the phrase actually means, since it has been used in two different
senses. On the one hand, it has been stated that no one is per se sophisticated
without access to the information.02 As used in this sense, the term simply means
that access is a prerequisite to sophistication, and an independent inquiry of
sophistication would be unnecessary. On the other hand, it has been stated that
sophistication is not a substitute for access 3 and that one must be shown to
have access and be sophisticated. 9 4 In this sense, the phrase has significance independent of the offering and even of the access requirement. It implies that an
individual deciding to partake in a private offering, by virtue of his education,
business acumen and prior investment experience, etc., will arguably be able to
understand and evaluate the information, enabling him to make an informed
investment decision. Hence, the issuer would have to prove that the offeree had
"access," and in addition, that he could "fend for himself." In either situation,
however, the overriding consideration is whether there exists the elusive relationship which would justify relying on the exemption in the first instance. This
consideration was explored in the following decision of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals.9 5
IV.

Continental Tobacco: AN ANoMALY?
A.

The Decision

Continental Tobacco Co. was incorporated in 1965 under the laws of South
Carolina for the purpose of engaging in the manufacturing and sale of cigarettes."0
To secure new financial support, the company attempted to sell various unregistered securities. Numerous meetings, which were described as "'boiler room
operation [s],' "7 were held with prospective purchasers. Since the offerees were a
diverse group, and many lacked both access and sophistication, the 1967 offering
91. Value Line Fund Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
ff91,523, at 94,970 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
92. United States v. Hill, 298 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Conn. 1969); Patton, The Private
Offering: A Simplified Analysis of the Initial Placement, 27 Bus. Law. 1089, 1094 (1972)

(asserting that the Hill analysis is counter-productive since it combines two separate tests,
i.e., the test of access and the test of sophistication).
93. See Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690 (5th Cir.
1971).
94. Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971).
95. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).

96. Id. at 142-43.
97. Id. at 143. The term connotes a high pressure effort in which deceptive tactics are
used to increase investor interest.
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was temporarily enjoined as a violation of section 5 of the Act.08 Subsequent to
bankruptcy and a change of management, Continental in 1969-1970 again sought
financing through the issuance and sale of unregistered securities,93 and in an
18 month period raised approximately $140,000 through the sale of the securities
to 35 of the 38 persons contacted. Since virtually the same tactics as used in
1967 were again employed, the SEC sought to have the temporary injunction
made permanent pursuant to section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 193310 The
district court, however, held that the offering was private, and, therefore, exempt
from registration.' 0 Reversing, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
02
The
district court's finding was induced by " 'an erroneous view of the law.' ,1"
court noted that Continental, in order to lay the groundwork for the private
offering exemption, 0 3 drafted a standard investment letter to be signed by all
the offerees, stipulating, inter alia, that the shares were being acquired for investment only, and that their present intention to hold the securities was unconditional 0 4 so that only an unforeseen change in circumstances would justify
distribution 05 which, in any event, would not be undertaken without first
obtaining an opinion of counsel on the legality of the distribution. 00 The investment letter also stated that each offeree understood the nature of the investment
and the risks involved, had received a prospectus and an unaudited financial
statement, and that no further questioning of the officers of the company or
further information was necessary to make an informed investment decision.
Continental also issued a brochure and placed a legend on the certificates of
98. Id. at 145; 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
99. 463 F.2d at 146.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970). See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
101. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 326 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 463 F.2d
137 (5th Cir. 1972). Apparently, the court arrived at this conclusion because almost all
of the investors executed an investment letter, received and had access to additional information, had personal contact with the officers of Continental, intended to hold the stock as
an investment, knew the risk, and had the experience necessary to make an informed decision.
Id. at 589-91.
102. 463 F.2d at 157; see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948) ; Chaney v. City of Galveston, 368 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1966).
103. 463 F.2d at 146; see note 15 supra and accompanying text. Although the investment
letter may indeed be a meaningless recital, failure to provide for it can be deemed as disregarding the significance of investment intent. The Wheat Report 171-72.
104. 463 F.2d at 146 n.1. Since the intent at the time of the original purchase is a
question of fact, an expressed limitation on resale, whether for a stated period of time
or under certain circumstances, "would tend to raise a question as to the original intent... !
Release 4,552, at 2,685; Batkin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 436, 447 n.24 (1958); note 16 supra
and accompanying text.
105. 463 F.2d at 146 n.1. The non-distributive intent cannot be conditioned on any
external event See Advanced Research Associates, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 579, 588 (1963); note
16 supra and accompanying text.
106. 463 F.2d at 146-47 n.1. This device is designed to insure the issuer some control over
the distribution of the securities; it should specify that it is the attorney of the issuer that
must be consulted. See Petrillo v. Seven Arts Productions, Ltd., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 91,921, at 96,171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
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stock which provided that the shares "may not be sold, transferred, pledged, or
hypothecated." 0 7 However, the record revealed that not all of the purchasers
had signed or even seen the investment letter.108 More importantly, however, the
measures employed by Continental were precautions only,109 and would not
establish the existence of the exemption "'in the absence of proof that the purchasers actually had access to the kind of information that a registration statement would have disclosed.' "" Moreover, since the Act was remedial legislation
for the protection of investors,"' the exemption would be strictly construed 12
and persons claiming it would have to prove" 3 its existence by exact and explicit
evidence." 4 While the SEC had established a prima fade case,"r the court noted
that Continental had failed to prove the exact number of offerees," 06 and that
the actual purchasers lacked any nexus among themselves or relationship to the
company, since many had never met the officers of Continental prior to their
purchase of the securities." 7 Under these circumstances, the court concluded
that even if all the offerees had been provided with the requisite information,
this fact alone would not insure the exemption; it would not establish the necessary relationship that must exist between the issuer and the offerees.118
107. 463 F.2d at 147. This type of restriction, while only a precaution, is encouraged by
the Commission. See, e.g., Cameron Indus., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 540, 546 (1959); Release 4,552, at
2,685. Furthermore, the absence of such a restriction might imply that the intention of the
purchasers was not bona fide. See United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 733 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966).
108. 463 F.2d at 150-53.
109. Id. at 160; see notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
110. 463 F.2d at 160, quoting United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675,
679 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967); Release 4,552, at 2,685.
111. 463 F.2d at 155; see A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38
(1941); SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 819 (1960).
112. 463 F.2d at 155. See, e.g., Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448
F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971).
113. 463 F.2d at 156. The burden of proof has been placed uniformly on the one
claiming the exemption. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953);
Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153, 159 (6th Cir. 1969); Advanced Research Associates, Inc.,
41 S.E.C. 579, 587-88 (1963).
114. 463 F.2d at 156. See Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1971); Repass
v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D. Colo. 1959).
115. 463 F.2d at 155-56. The essential elements of a prima fade case are that (1) no
registration was in effect, (2) the defendant sold or offered to sell unregistered securities, and
(3) interstate facilities were used. Id. at 155. See Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59, 63
(N.D. Ohio 1964) ; 3 Loss 1693.
116. 463 F.2d at 161; see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
117. 463 F.2d at 158. Not all of the offerees, who were, inter alia, dentists, physicians,
and housewives, had even seen the prospectus or had any occasion to meet the officers of
Continental.
118. Id. at 160; see Release 4,552, at 2,684; 4 Loss 2632 (Supp. 1969).
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B.

Analysis

It is dear that the Continental offering violated the Securities Act- 19-the
offerees lacked sophistication as well as access. However, the court, in relying
heavily on Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc.,- 0 and on the
brief of the SEC, defined the requisite "relationship" in such a way as to deny
the exemption in many financings where it had been thought to be available.
The court stated that the exemption would be available only where:
the number of offerees is so limited that they may constitute a class of persons having
such a privileged relationship with the issuer that their present knowledge and facilities for acquiring information about the issuer would make registration unnecessary
for their protection .... sM
The SEC brief further opined that:
Before the statutory protections may be safely eliminated in any case, the issuer must
affi ratively demonstrate .. . that each person to whom the unregistered securities
were offered was able to "fend" for himself-in other words, that each offeree had a
relationship to the company tantamount to that of an 'insider'in terms of his ability to
know, to understand and to verify for himself all of the relevant facts about the
company and its securities. This type of offeree through his own knowledge, sophistication and unfettered access to the citadels of corporate power and decision-making
can protect himself; he does not require the protections of the Act .... = 2
The brief also noted that the fact that the officers felt it necessary to disseminate
information in a prospectus "tends to demonstrate that its offerees were not
knowledgeable or sophisticated and that they lacked meaningful access to
corporate information."'I Moreover, the fact that the investors relied on an
attorney demonstrated unfamiliarity with the company, 2 4 since there "is no
substitute for a direct relationship giving the investor first-hand access to
corporate information. ' 25
Combining the "tantamount to an insider" language of the SEC brief with
the "privileged relationship-present knowledge" test promulgated by the court,
the result would seem to require that the relationship be such that, independently
of the offering, the offeree has a right, by virtue of his position, to demand
and have access to the information. This interpretation is feared by some as
signalling the end to the traditional interpretation of the private offering
119. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970); see note 9 supra and accompanying text.
120. 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
121. 463 F.2d at 159 (emphasis added), quoting Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l
Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 688 n.6 (5th Cir. 1971).
122. Brief for Appellant at 28 (emphasis added in part) (footnote omitted).
123. Id. at 29.
124. Reply Brief for Appellant at 3.
125. Id. at 3.
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exemption. 126 Under tests previously enunciated, the offeree had to be shown
to either possess or have access to the information. Thus, while some relationship had to exist independently of the offering, there were dearly different
types of relationships, and the access requirement varied accordingly. On the
one hand, where there existed a "special relationship," there was no need to
furnish the information, since all sources of information were readily available
by virtue of the position. On the other hand, where the relationship was such
as only to distinguish the offerees from the general public, then the issuer had
to prove that they had the information necessary for an informed investment
decision. In either case, the necessary result was knowledgeable investors,
capable of making informed investment decisions. Under the Continental decision, however, the issuer is in a precarious position. If the offeree lacks the
necessary information, the exemption will fail, and if the issuer furnishes the
information, the exemption will likewise fail, since that would show a lack
of first-hand knowledge. The logical conclusion, then, is that the knowledge
must be possessed prior to and independent of the offering. This anomalous
result flows from the fact that the "special relationship-present knowledge" test
employed by the court in Continental was taken out of context from a law
review article. 27 In the article, former SEC Commissioner Orrick, was specifying
a situation in which it would not be necessary to furnish information, since by
virtue of a special relationship, the offeree would already have the requisite
information. The description of what this "special relationship" entailed was
not intended to define an exclusive class. Indeed, if the class were exclusive,
then inquiries into access and sophistication would be unnecessary, since both
would be presumed by virtue of the special relationship.
Although the Fifth Circuit did not employ verbatim the "tantamount to an
insider" language of the SEC brief, which Commissioner Hugh F. Owens felt
was overly restrictive and "could lead to such a narrowing of the exemption
that even an institutional investor could not qualify,"' 128 a literal reading of
the "present knowledge" test would still require that the offerees, in addition
to being informed investors, would have to have a special relationship before
they could "fend for themselves." Arguably, Continental does not reflect the
present state of the law on private offerings. 129 Nevertheless, the decision makes
126. Goldberg, The Continental Tobacco Case: Private Placements 1972, 169 N.Y...,
Jan. 12, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
127. The article cited was Orrick, Non-Public Offerings of Corporate Securities-Limitations on the Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act, 21 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1959).
In the preceding paragraph Orrick noted that "Congress recognized that under certain
circumstances it might be either impractical or unnecessary for an issuer to make available
as a matter of public record all material information . . . [w]here adequate safeguards

...do in fact exist .... "Id.
128. BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 152, at G-2 (May 17, 1972).
129. Id. See also id. No. 157, at A-10 to 11 (June 21, 1972). The reaction to the
decision uniformly has been unfavorable. See, e.g., R. Garrett, Private Placements, In
Sale and Resale of Restricted Securities 79, 83-85. Furthermore, former Chairman Casey envisions a more expansive, rather than restrictive, use of the private offering exemption.
See BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 165, at F-1 to 3 (Aug. 16, 1972).
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strikingly apparent the uncertainties surrounding the private offering exemption,
and was certainly an impetus to the promulgation of proposed Rule 146.

V. PROPOSED RULE 146: A

HAVEN FOR VENTURE CAPITALISTS?

130
accompanying Proposed Rule 146131
The Commission noted in the release
that the vague and uncertain parameters of the private offering exemption "may
be hindering the raising of capital by new businesses that are not sufficiently
seasoned to attract investment banking firms willing to underwrite public
offerings of their securities." 132 Yet from the standpoint of investor protection,
it was clearly desirable that capitalization of new ventures come from sophisticated individuals and institutions through private placements. The purpose
of Rule 146, then, is to provide greater assurance through the delineation of
"objective standards upon which responsible businessmen may rely [in raising
capital] and also to deter reliance on that section for offerings of securities to
persons who are unable to fend for themselves in terms of obtaining information about the issuer and of assuming the risk of investment." 133 Since the
Commission believed that the most significant concepts in determining when a
transaction does not involve a public offering were "access to the information"
and the ability to "fend for themselves," 134 many of the conditions imposed
in the Proposed Rule coincide with elements currently considered by the courts.
The remainder of this Comment will analyze the conditions imposed by the
Proposed Rule, with particular emphasis on whether the stated goal of "objectivity" will be satisfactorily attained.

A.

Limitations on the Manner of Offering

Consistent with prior releases, 135 the Commission reiterated that limitations
on the manner of the offering serve to assure that the persons to whom the
offering is made have the necessary access to the information and can fend
for themselves. Accordingly, section (c) of the Proposed Rule provides that
general advertising is prohibited, 136 and that the securities can "be offered and
sold only in a negotiated transaction,"'137 which is defined in section (a)(3)
130. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5,336 (Nov. 28, 1972), (1972-1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 79,108, at 82,395 [hereinafter cited as Release Sr336].
131. 37 Fed. Reg. 26137 (1972).
132. Release 5,336, at 82,398.
133. Id. See also BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 165, at F-I to 3 (Aug. 16, 1972).
134. Release 5,336, at 82,400.
135. Release 285, at 2,676; id., No. 4,552, at 2,683.
136. Proposed SEC Rule 146(c) (2), 37 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26140 (1972), provides: "Neither
the issuer nor any person acting on its behalf shall offer or sell the securities by means of
any form of general advertising, including, but not limited to, the following: (i) Any advertisement, article, notice, or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or
similar medium; (ii) Any radio or television broadcast; (iii) Any seminar or promotional
meeting; and (iv) Any letter, circular, notice, or written communication sent, given, or
communicated to persons otherwise than in connection with a negotiated transaction."
137. Id. § (c)(1), 37 Fed. Reg. at 26,140.
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as a "transaction in which securities are offered and the terms and arrangements relating to any sale of securities are arrived at through direct communication between the issuer or any person acting on its behalf and the purchaser188
or his investment representative. ' '139 While the term negotiated transaction
is not new,140 its present definition proves troublesome, since it is not clear
to what extent the "terms and arrangements" must be negotiated. It hardly
seems inconsistent with the claim of a private offering exemption, for example,
that the issuer establishes a non-negotiable price or presents the offering on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis, provided the offering is directly communicated. In
fact, in many private offerings to institutional investors, "any negotiation
which takes place will be between the issuer and one single lead investor.., not
authorized to act as investment representative for other investors. '141 Since
the purpose of the limitation on the manner of the offering is to assure access
and the ability to fend for themselves, it would seem that both criteria are
amply provided for by the requirements of direct communication and the prohibition on public advertising. What is or is not negotiated could be left to the
discretion of the parties; the offerees are always free to reject the offer.
Particularly significant is the fact that the issuer and offeree need never meet.
The negotiated transaction can take place between one acting on behalf of
the issuer and the investment representative of the offeree. Thus, if the offeree
employs an investment representative, only he need be sophisticated, and the
preparation of documents could be reduced to the minimum in light of the
financial expertise of the investment representative.1 42 However, it is first
necessary to determine who qualifies as an investment representative. The term
is defined in section (a) (2) as any person who:
(i) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the risks of a prospective investment;
(ii) has been duly authorized by the person for whose account securities are to be
purchased to act as agent for such person in effecting such purchase; and
(iii) is independent of the issuer and is not acting on behalf of the issuer in connection with the transaction. 143
Since section (a) (2) (i) provides that the investment representative must
have knowledge and experience in both financial and business matters, it would
appear that only large investment banking firms, with their extensive research
138. Since the offering can take place only in a negotiated transaction, the term "purchaser" should instead read "offeree." See Comment on Proposed Rule 146, Submitted by
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Securities Regulation,

in Sale and Resale of Restricted Securities 89, 100 [hereinafter cited as Committee Comment].
139.

Proposed SEC Rule 146(a) (3), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,140 (1970).

140. See Release 285, at 2,677.
141.

Comment on Proposed Rule 146, Submitted by the Law Firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr

& Soils-Cohen, in Sale and Resale of Restricted Securities 109, 113 [hereinafter cited as Wolf].
The commentary noted that there is a vast body of law dealing with bona fide negotiations, and that this should not be incorporated into the Proposed Rule. Id.
142. Goldberg, New SEC Rule 146: An Analysis, 168 N.Y.LJ., Dec. 1, 1972, at 4, col. 7.
143.

Proposed SEC Rule 146(a) (2), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,140 (1972).
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departments, would qualify as investment representatives. Indeed, the Commission has "hinted broadly that lawyers and accountants will not qualify
solely on the basis of their expertise in legal and accounting matters. 1 1 44 It is
questionable whether even broker-dealer firms or investment advisors would
qualify as representatives, for while they understand the marketplace, they
do not necessarily have the requisite knowledge and experience in both business
and financial matters. 4 5 Assuming that the knowledge and experience must
relate to the field in which the issue is offered, then the investment representative would have to be a specialist in that field. 146 While this presents no
particular difficulty where the offering is to a large institutional investor, the
non-institutional investor generally will rely either on counsel or himself, and
presumably neither would have the necessary qualifications. The question of
qualifications is of more than casual significance, since the issuer or one
acting on his behalf must make this determination and risk liability if he happens
to be wrong.
The section further provides that the investment representative must be duly
authorized to act as an agent of the person for whose account the securities
are to be purchased. It is unclear what would constitute "authorization." For
example, would the typical broker-dealer discretionary account, or a general
power of attorney, be sufficient authorization, or must the authorization relate
to this specific transaction? Even if one is dearly authorized, it is questionable
whether any purpose is served by further requiring that he act as an agent.
On the one hand, a purchaser may negotiate a transaction for himself but
appoint an agent to attend the settlement and perform the ministerial functions
of executing the documents, delivering the check, and receiving the certificates.
Delegation of this type should hardly render the agent an investment representative. On the other hand, a purchaser may appoint an investment representative
to study the transaction without delegating any agency powers, wishing instead
to reserve the final investment decision to himself. 147 Neither of these arrangements should be inconsistent with the rule. The concept of investment representative is designed to insure that the purchaser has an advisor who can
adequately protect his interests, and the existence of an agency relationship
is immaterial. "If the purchaser has selected a person on whose judgment he
will rely it should be immaterial whether that person is acting as agent, adviser,
consultant or otherwise." '1 48
The determination of what constitutes an investment adviser is further
complicated since the definition provides that he must act independently of
144. Freund, Private Placements-Effect of Rule 146, 168 N.Y.LJ., Dec. 11, 1972, at 28,
coL 6. The author suggests "we wll see the emergence of a new growth industry, selfstyled 'qualified investment representatives!." Id.
145. See Fleischman & Duff, Special Problems Raised by Proposed Rule 146, in Sale
and Resale of Restricted Securities 257 [hereinafter cited as Fleischman & Duff].
146. Fleischman & Duff 258-62.
147. See Wolf 112. See also Committee Comment 97-100.
148. Committee Comment 97.
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the issuer,' 49 a requirement deemed "totally unrealistic in the light of prevailing commercial practice."'150 Indeed, commonly an investment banker retained by the issuer will structure the transaction, perhaps invest some of his
own money, and then present the issue to some of his own clients. Moreover,
it is not uncommon for the issuer to suggest one investment representative to
the investors, since such an arrangement is practical, efficient and economical.
Even where the purchaser independently retains an investment adviser, it is
comnon for the issuer to bear the expense.' 5 ' In all of these situations, even
when the investment representative is clearly "not acting on behalf of the
issuer,"'1 52 the independence requirement may well have been violated. The
Commission stated that independence requires "at least, that such representative be selected by the investor rather than by the issuer.'1 53 Clearly, the
intent of the requirement is to insure investor protection by preventing conflicts of interest. Since the key factor is the accountability of the investment
representative to the offerees,15 4 an expression to this effect would adequately
set the confines of the relationship required between the offeree and the investment representative, and it would not call into question the viability of
existing practices in relation to the conditions imposed by the Proposed Rule.
B. Nature of the Offerees
Since the Commission felt that an important requirement is the ability of
the offerees to fend for themselves, the Proposed Rule is conditioned on the
nature of the offerees. Accordingly, section (d) (1) provides that an issuer or
one acting on his behalf must have reasonable grounds to believe prior to
making the offer:
(1) That either the offeree or his investment representative has such knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of utilizing the information ...to evaluate the risks of the prospective investment and of making an
informed investment decision ....155

The Commission offered no suggestions for interpreting the section, other than
to provide that sophistication is a necessary element of the "fending for themselves" requirement of Ralston. 5 6 Yet, as previously noted,157 sophistication
149. Proposed SEC Rule 146(a)(2)(iii), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,140 (1972).
150. Wolf 109.
151. See, e.g., Committee Comment 97; Fleischman & Duff 264.
152. Proposed SEC Rule 146(a) (2) (iii), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,140 (1972).
153. Release 5,336, at 82,401.
154. Wolf 111. The relationship is analogous to an underwriter in a public offering, since
he negotiates with the issuer and also sells the securities either as principal or agent. "Investors
are quite willing and should be permitted to rely on the investment banker who acts for
them and also the issuer ... ." Id. at 110.
155. Proposed SEC Rule 146(d) (1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,140 (1972).
156. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953); see Release 5,336, at 82,401.
157. See notes 89-95 supra and accompanying text. Compare Value Line Fund, Inc. v.
Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fI 91,523, at 94,956 (S.D.N.Y.
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has been an intangible and elusive concept, incapable of objective application
and measurement. When, for example, could an issuer or one acting on his
behalf be safely assured that he has reasonable grounds to believe that the
offeree or his investment representative can evaluate the risks and make an
informed investment decision? While he can perhaps insure that the decision
is informed by providing the offeree or his representative with the required information, this fact alone does not guarantee that he is capable of evaluating
the risks. Indeed, self-serving statements, similar to letters of non-distributive
intent, will be forthcoming, but they will certainly "carry very little weight in
the face of more concrete facts and circumstances .... " As a consequence,
an issuer in order to protect himself must resort to extensive inquiry, considering
such factors as the offeree's education and prior investment experience. Even
after such inquiry, however, an issuer will have to evaluate what weight to give
to the factors. For example, if the offeree is a professional in a field unrelated
to either business or finance, would he be able to evaluate the risks? If one
has extensive investment experience, but has consistently lost money, does this
demonstrate a lack of sophistication? Since it is unclear how extensively the
issuer must investigate or what weight can be given to evidentiary factors, it
is not unreasonable to assume that the issuer, in order to protect himself, would
require the offeree to procure expensive expert advice in the majority of
offerings.
Not only must the issuer or one acting on his behalf have reasonable grounds
to believe that the offeree or his representative is sophisticated enough to evaluate
the risks of the investment, he must also believe that "the offeree is a person
who is able to bear the economic risks of the investment."15 The Commission
gave no explanation for the inclusion of this provision other than to note its
appropriateness since "as a purchaser of unregistered securities, he may not be
able to resell such securities publicly without registration for a period of time
after his initial purchase." 160 The Commission offered no criteria to aid the
issuer in subjectively determining that the offeree can bear the risk, or, for
that matter, what the phrase even means. It has been surmised that "at the
1965), with United States v. Custer Channel Wimg Corp., 376 F.2d 67S, 678 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 US. 850 (1967).
158. SEC Securities Act Release No. 1,862 (Dec. 14, 1938), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L.Rep.
II 1,533, at 2,204; see also Release 4,452, at 2,685.
159. Proposed SEC Rule 146(d)(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,140 (1972). The condition,
according to the Commission, is consistent with the concept of "fending for themselves."
However, this interpretation is not supported by prior judicial decisions. See Advanced
Research Associates, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 579, 589 (1963). See also SEC v. Royal Hawaiian
Management Corp., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 91,982, at
96,338 (1967). The financial status of the offeree and prior investment experience, have
been treated as evidentiary factors rather than as essential requirements for the existence of
the exemption. See Henderson v. Hayden, Stone, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fI 93,504, at 92,436-37 (5th Cir. 1972) (although the purchaser was a sophisticated investor and had a stock portfolio worth several million dollars, the court found
a public offering).
160.

Release 5,336, at 82,401-02.
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very least, an offeree would have to be in a sufficiently liquid position to be
able safely to lock-up some of his capital ....,,161 If this is the intent of the
requirement, then the issuer must determine whether the investment is prudent
in light of the financial status of the offeree. But would reasonable grounds
for evaluating the risk-bearing ability of the offeree be provided merely by
obtaining a financial statement from the offeree? Even if it were obtained,
what percentage of one's net worth could safely be invested in restricted
securities? 162 One commentator concluded that the suitability of the investment, e.g., liquidity, was not the meaning of the "able to bear the economic
risks" phrase; rather, it was "the ability to bear the loss of principal on the
investment."' 163 Under this interpretation, an issuer would have to determine
what risk is inherent in the investment itself, as well as the risk-bearing ability
of the individual investor. Furthermore, the latter determination "would turn
not only on the financial circumstances of the investor (e.g., the extent of his
standard of living, his
savings, earnings, other investments, etc.) but also his
64
number of dependents, the state of his health, etc."'
The burden of proof placed on the issuer under the "reasonable grounds"
test is indeed harsh. It may, in fact, be impossible to meet, except in situations
where the issuer has prior knowledge of the offeree's personal financial affairs,
since the reasonable grounds to believe that the offeree can bear the economic
risk must be established "prior to making an offer."'16 As a practical matter,
offers are commonly directed in the first instance to intermediaries, such as
"bank trust departments, investment advisers or other 'investment representatives,' with the possible purchasing accounts then being unknown to the issuer."'1 0
In this situation, the issuer or one acting on his behalf would not even know
who the prospective offerees might be, and would be risking section 5 liability
if the intermediary made an offer to an unqualified offeree. The Commission,
perhaps anticipating this difficulty, stated that an "inquiry to verify that belief
[that the offeree is qualified] is not in and of itself an offer."' 6 7 However, it
is not unreasonable to assume that a prospective offeree would be reluctant
to divulge personal financial information on the vague hope of developing an
investment opportunity. Moreover, the issuer could hardly be expected to
solicit information without at least mentioning the purpose of the inquiry and
some details concerning the offering which, in light of the broad interpretation
161. Goldberg, New SEC Rule 146: An Analysis, 168 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1972, at 4, col. 7.
162. Fleischman & Duff 265. The authors further note that even if the ability to bear
the economic risks of the investment could be objectively established simply by limiting
the investment to a percentage of the net worth of the offeree, a further question would be
whether the percentage should be different where some of the other assets of the offeree
are speculative securities rather than cash or its equivalent. Id.
163. Wolf 116.
164. Id.
165. Proposed SEC Rule 146(d), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,140 (1972) (emphasis added).
166. Committee Comment 102.
167. Release 5,336, at 82,402.
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of what constitutes an offer,' could result in the loss of the exemption if the
prospective offeree turns out to be unqualified. 09
Over and above the practical difficulties in determining when an offeree can
"bear the economic risks," the provision has been uniformly criticized on
philosophical grounds:
The 1933 Act is a disclosure statute. It does not require that investment decisions be
appropriate for the investor, only that the decisions are based upon appropriate information which the investor can evaluate for himself. It should be sufficient to provide that the private placee is in a position to understand the investment risk, not
o
that the issuer be satisfied that he can assume it.17
Indeed, the Act was designed to prevent fraudulent abuses by requiring registration of securities so that through disclosure an informed investment decision
could be made. Once the investor is properly informed, the Act is not designed
to protect the individual from himself or to control his speculative urge.
C.

Access to Information

Under the Commission's interpretation of "fending for themselves," an
offeree must be both sophisticated and have access to the information. Accordingly, section (e) of the Proposed Rule provides that during the course
of the negotiated transaction the offeree or his investment representative must:
(1) have the same kind of information that the Act would make available in the form
of a registration statement, to the extent such information is available, or have access
to such information ....171
Since the Commission made no attempt to define "access to the information,"
one must assume that its content is to be gleaned from prior releases and judicial
decisions. 172 However, few areas in the private offering exemption have proved
more evasive and incapable of objective application. One commentator surmised
that the access standards are satisfied by either a voluntary giving of information or by the existence of facts which indicate that the offeree has access to
the information." 7a In light of recent decisions, however, it is not clear that such
a conclusion is justified. Except in the dearest of instances, the issuer cannot
be sure that the offeree is in a position to have the requisite access, or that
simply opening its books to the offeree would suffice. Thus, to protect himself,
168. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
169. See Wolf 114-15 (suggesting that qualifications should be established prior to completing the sale rather than prior to making the offer).
170. Id. at 115-16. See also Lederman, Proposed SEC Rule 146: An Analysis and Comment, 169 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1973, at 1, col 4; Committee Comment 102-03 (suggesting that
the clause be deleted, and, as an alternative, that the offeree or his investment representative
be required to make this judgment rather than the issuer, since it relates primarily to the
offeree's personal affairs. Id. at 103).
171. Proposed SEC Rule 146(e) (1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,140 (1972).
172. See section III supra.
173. Goldberg, New SEC Rule 146: An Analysis, 168 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1972, at 4, coL 7.
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the issuer would use the alternative provision of actually providing the informaprotion to the offerees. However, under existing interpretations,17 ' voluntarily
10
viding the information might not satisfy the access requirements.
The uncertainty in this area is further compounded by the fact that the
Proposed Rule requires that the information must be of the same kind that
would be made available in a registration statement, 170 but only "to the extent
such information is available.' 177 Immediately, one must inquire: when is such
information available? 17 8 The registration statement requirement, taken literally,
would require the issuer to develop a disclosure document similar to a going
public prospectus. Since the information is, theoretically, always available provided that the issuer expends time and money in analyzing raw data to comply
with the requirements of a registration statement, it would appear that the
phrase refers to information available at the time of the offering. If this is a
justified interpretation, would scanty or limited information satisfy the requirement? It would hardly seem that this was intended, since the offeree
is in no less need of protection in either instance. Consequently, it is unclear
how extensive the information must be or whether the issuer must take affirmative action to make the information available. In light of this ambiguity, it has
been suggested that the provision be qualified by the phrase "'without significant
additional effort or expense.' M79
The Proposed Rule also provides that an offeree or his representative must
"[have access to any additional information necessary to verify the accuracy
of such information." 8 0 No indication is given of what possible additional information the offerees need in order to verify the accuracy of information
already received. Such a provision is normally associated with underwriters
in a public offering because of their potential liability in effecting distributions
under the Act. Perhaps the underlying purpose of the verification requirement
was to define the type of relationship the offeree must have with the issuer.' 8 '
Indeed, the Commission, in explaining the appropriateness of the requirement,
cited a prior release which held that voluntarily supplying information would
174. See SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 159 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 688 n.6 (5th Cir. 1971).
175. See notes 122-25 supra.
176. Proposed SEC Rule 146(e) (1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,140 (1972) ; see note 53 supra
and accompanying text. See also Wolf 119, wherein it is suggested that purchasers in private
offerings do not necessarily expect to receive precisely the same type of information that
would be provided through registration; thus, a more appropriate formula would be: "Such
information as to the business done by the issuer... as will, in the opinion of management,
indicate the general nature and scope of the business ... and will be sufficient for an evaluation of the investment opportunity." Id.
177. Proposed SEC Rule 146(e) (1), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,140 (1972).
178. See generally Freund, Private Placements-Effects of Rule 146, 168 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11,
1972, at 28, col. 6.

179. Committee Comment 104.
180. Proposed SEC Rule 146(e) (2), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,141 (1972).
181. Lederman, Proposed SEC Rule 146: An Analysis and Comment, 169 N.Y.L.J., Jan.
22, 1973, at 4, col. 1.
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not insure the exemption, because of "the absence of statutory safeguards and
sanctions attendant to the registration process."' 182
D.

Limitation on the Number of Purchasers

Perhaps the most significant contribution to clarity provided by Proposed
Rule 146 is the adoption of a standard numerical limitation which reduces the
present confusion with respect to the number of allowable offerees. Section (f)
of the Proposed Rule provides that:
There shall not be more than 35 persons in any consecutive 12-month period who
purchase securities of the issuer in transactions pursuant to this section, or not pursuant to this rule but otherwise in reliance on section 4(2) of the Act; provided
however, there shall be excluded in determining such number any person who purchases securities from the issuer for cash in an amount not less than $250,000.183
One advantageous effect of this section is that an issuer, or one acting on his
behalf, who does not use public advertising, can approach an unlimited number
of offerees, provided that the actual number of purchasers does not exceed
35 in any consecutive 12-month period, "a number usually
well in excess of the
4
number needed to get a new venture off the ground."''
However, while the 35 purchasers limitation does indeed provide an objective standard, "the price of extracting relatively greater certainty . . . can
be very high,"'185 since the restriction is more severe than is readily apparent.
For example, there is no provision for exempting the institutional purchaser
who purchases large blocks of securities in amounts less than $250,000.18 Consequently, each account of the institutional investor would be considered as a
separate person in computing the number limitation. 8 7 Moreover, no distinction
is drawn between classes of securities. 88 If an issuer entered into "a long term
revolving credit agreement with 20 banks (assuming less than $250,000 per
bank), the issuer could not have a private placement qualifying under the Rule
with more than 15 additional purchasers for a year thereafter,hl 9 regardless
of the distinct time, manner of offering, and purpose of the transactions. Finally,
once the Proposed Rule is relied on, any subsequent private offering, even if
outside the Rule, is limited to a number of purchasers that will not cumulatively
exceed the 35 number limitation. These provisions have the effect of limiting
the desirability of relying on the Proposed Rule. Indeed, under traditional
interpretations of a transaction, if the offerings were sufficiently distinct in
time, manner of offering, and purpose, they would be viewed separately rather
than as a single integrated offering. 1e Furthermore, since at least theoretically
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Release 5,336, at 82,402; see Release 4,552, at 2,684; 2 Goldberg § 2.4(c).
Proposed SEC Rule 146(f), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,141 (1972).
Goldberg, New SEC Rule 146: An Analysis, 168 N.Y.L., Dec. 1, 1972, at 4, col. 8.
Garrett, Private Placements, in Sale and Resale of Restricted Securities 81 (1973).
See Release 5,336, at 82,402.
Id. at 82,401.

188.

See Wolf 121-22.

189. Id. at 121.
190. See, e.g., Release 4,552, at 2,686.
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the number of offerees is irrevelant provided the "requisite relationship" can
be established, there would be little practical purpose to rely on the Proposed
Rule.
Although the Commission provides no explanation for the exemption of purchases in excess of $250,000, it was apparently intended as a quasi-institutional
exemption. Indeed, former Chairman Casey noted that adopting the dollar
standard "avoids the complex task of defining an institution.1 91 However, the
$250,000 figure has been uniformly criticized as excessive.1 92 One commentator
notes that it will limit the potential of new businesses to obtain financing, since
in venture capital transactions, where the investment risk is high, smaller purchases are often made.- 93 Furthermore, the exemption is applicable only to cash
purchases. As a consequence, each person receiving securities in the acquisition
of businesses or properties will be included in the 35 purchaser limitation, regardless of the fact that the acquisition may in fact be in excess of $250,000.104
Commentators have recommended that this anomolous result be rectified. 10
E. Conditions To Be Met and Non-Exclusivity
Section (b) of Proposed Rule 146 provides that "[a]ny transaction ... which
meets all the conditions of this section shall be deemed not to be a transaction
involving any public offering ... ."196 As presently structured, the Rule would
not be applicable, for example, if an offering were to be made to one unqualified
offeree, even though not an ultimate purchaser, or if the issuer neglected to
legend the certificates in compliance with section (g)(2)(i), 197 or failed to
report the sale in compliance with section (h).1 98 Failure to comply with any
191. BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 165, at F-1 (Aug. 16, 1962).
192. See Committee Comment 105.
193. Lederman, Proposed SEC Rule 146: An Analysis and Comment, 169 N.Y.U., Jan.
19, 1973, at 4, col. 5.
194. Id., cols. 4-5. The author suggests that if the Proposed Rule retains the integration
between cash purchases and acquisitions, then the acquisition purchases should not be
arbitrarily excluded from the $250,000 exemption. Id., col. 5.
195. See, e.g., Committee Comment 104.
196. Proposed SEC Rule 146(b), 37 Fed. Reg. 26,137, 26,140 (1972).
197. Id. § (g), 37 Fed. Reg. at 26,141, provides that after reasonable inquiry, the Issuer
or one acting on his behalf must not be aware of circumstances indicating that the purchasers may be underwriters. Furthermore, to protect against deferred distribution, the
issuer must take reasonable care which includes, but is not limited to, the placing of a
legend on the certificate, issuance of stop-transfer instructions to issuer's agent, or, If the
issuer lacks an agent, then placing a notation in the records of the issuer, and obtaining a
signed written agreement from the purchaser that the securities will not be sold without
registration or other compliance with the Act.
198. Id. § (h), 37 Fed. Reg. at 26,141, provides: "Within 45 days after the end
of any quarter of the issuer's fiscal year during which sale of securities are effected in
reliance on this section, the issuer shall file three copies of a report of sales on Form 146
....
Provided however, that such report need not be filed if the issuer has not sold securities in reliance on this rule within the twelve months preceding the first sale covered
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one of the conditions prevents reliance on the Rule, and could result in section
5 liability and rescission by all the purchasers. This result is overly harsh and
may adversely affect offerings that were dearly private, since the conditions
are of varied importance. For example, section (g) ,10 which is designed to
prevent deferred distribution, and section (h),200 which requires that the sale
be reported, serve secondary functions, and are not designed to protect the
initial investor. Accordingly, it has been suggested that these requirements be
classified as precautionary or legal requirements rather than as conditions to
the availability of the exemption. Thus, "[a]n issuer which failed to meet the
requirements presumably would be exposed to minor sanctions for such violations, but . . would not be subject to liability for violating Section 5 merely
because of a failure to comply with one of these documentation requirements." 20
'
An overriding consideration of the Commission was to assure that it was
dearly understood that the Proposed Rule was not an exclusive means of making
a private offering under section 4(2), since "no one rule can adequately provide
for the various circumstances surrounding the legitimate private offering .... "-0
The intended design, however, may prove illusory. First, the fact that the limitation on the number of offerees must include transactions outside the rule
militates against the non-exclusive nature of the Rule. Second, since the Rule
incorporates most of the criteria currently associated with private offerings under
section 4(2), it is not unreasonable to assume that, in time, the interpretations
offered by the Commission will be applied to all private offerings by courts and
diligent counsel. Third, in light of the present confusion surrounding what "relationship" is required to qualify for a private offering exemption, Proposed Rule
146 may become exclusive, in practical effect, by default. Indeed, it has been
noted that:
there is very little if anything left of the private offering exemption. It is unlikely
that a private placement which failed to meet the tests of Rule 146 would qualify
under the dicta of Continental Tobacco Co. and its progeny. Almost every attribute
of a private placement required by Rule 146 must be met, along with many other
criteria .... 203
by the report in an amount which when added to the amount of sales covered by the report
would exceed $50,000. Such report shall be deemed to have been filed if the issuer is subject
to the periodic reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and has filed
a report on Form 10-K .

.

. or Form lo-Q .

.

. which contains the information required

by Item 6 and Item C, respectively, of such forms." (emphasis omitted).
199. Id. § (g), 37 Fed. Reg. at 26,141.
200. Id. § (h), 37 Fed. Reg. at 26,141. This is particularly significant since the reporting
requirement applies chiefly to privately held companies or small publicly held companies,
neither of which traditionally have been well-versed in SEC regulations. Hence, coupled
with the broad definition of securities, there would be numerous inadvertent violations which
would cause the exemption to fail if all the conditions must be uniformly met. See Wolf 122.
201. Wolf 124.
202. Release 5,336, at 82,402.
203. Wolf 128.
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EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED RULE

The purpose of Proposed Rule 146 is to insure greater access to venture
capital 20 4 through private offerings by providing more objective standards and
curtailing uncertainties "to the extent feasible. 205 While the Proposed Rule
significantly changes the present law by providing that the issuer or one acting
on his behalf can approach an unlimited number of offerees and that the
negotiated transaction can take place entirely between representatives of the
parties, it is questionable whether the stated goal is satisfied. Indeed, the only
additional objectivity is the flat numerical limitation. Unquestionably, the issuer
is assured that if the number of purchasers exceeds 35 in any consecutive
12-month period, exclusive of major investors, the exemption will not be available
under the Proposed Rule. However, the areas of existing uncertainty are broader
than the determination of the number of offerees. The major area of confusion
has been what constitutes access, and the determination of when the offeree can
fend for himself. Unfortunately, the Proposed Rule incorporates both areas,
without even addressing the problem. The issuer can still only speculate on
whether the offeree or his representative is sophisticated enough to utilize the
information, or whether their position is such that they have access to the information, or in the alternative, whether information must be affirmatively
supplied. In either case, the overriding consideration remains whether the information was broad enough to enable an informed investment decision. Given
the current confusion in this area, it is hardly arguable that the Proposed Rule
provides greater certainty for either the issuer or the courts. Admittedly, both
Commission and court discretion are required in this area, since short of requiring that all offerings be registered or a lessening of investor protection, 200 a
degree of subjectivity is unavoidable in determining whether the investor is
sophisticated or has sufficient information to make an informed investment
decision. Indeed, securities practitioners, while "cursing the uncertainties, ever
mindful of the potential liabilities, "20 have nonetheless managed "to shepherd
the distribution of billions of dollars worth of securities into purportedly private
hands." 208 Thus, although the ambiguity is not crucial, if the Proposed Rule is
to operate satisfactorily, the Commission must present an extensive restatement,
204. Goldberg, New SEC Rule 146: An Analysis, 168 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1972, at 4, col. 8.
205. Release 5,336, at 82,398.
206. See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 227(b)(1)(A) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972). The section
provides that institutional investors and "not more than thirty-five other persons" qualify

for a "limited offering," the counterpart to the private offering, without consideration of
their sophistication or access to the information. Moreover, the number limitation applies
to "buyers" rather than to "offerees." While this provision provides the maximum degree of
objectivity by eliminating any consideration of the subjective standards of "sophistication"
and "access," it leaves the non-institutional investor, short of fraud on the part of the
issuer, virtually without any protection.
207. Freund, Private Placements--Effects of Rule 146, 168 N.YJ.J., Dec. 11, 1972, at
28, col. 1.
208. Id.
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establishing specific guidelines and repudiating factors no longer viable and dicta
inconsistent with the intent of the private offering exemption.
Even though uncertainty is perhaps unavoidable in this area, the onerous
effects can be miminized. For example, while the Rule attains a degree of
objectivity by providing that only the number of purchasers must be considered
in computing the 35 person limitation, it inexplicitly lessens the effectiveness of the provision by retaining broad protection for the offerees, since they
also must be shown to have been qualified. Thus, the issuer must still refrain
from inadvertently making an "offer," and must still be cognizant of the
number of offerees, since he must be able to prove their qualifications. This
requirement seems self-defeating. It is difficult to comprehend how an offeree
who does not purchase can be injured.2 0 9 Indeed, the Rule would operate just
as effectively if the determination of sophistication or "nature" was limited solely
to the purchaser. This would lessen the already harsh evidentiary burden on the
issuer, and would not lessen the desired protection of the Rule. Furthermore,
there is no danger that the offering would become inherently more public,
since public advertising is prohibited. Also, the issuer would realize it is
superfluous to make an offer to an unqualified offeree, since, if he did purchase,
the exemption would fail.
Perhaps the primary contribution to clarity that could be made by the
Proposed Rule would be to expressly provide for an exemption for institutional
investors. Indeed, as previously noted, this often has been recommended,2 10
and the courts, as a practical matter, have already recognized the distinction,
since institutions are both presumptively sophisticated and have access to the
information. Furthermore, the $250,000 exemption is obviously geared toward
the institutional investor. However, while these purchasers are exempted from
the 35 purchaser limitation, they are still subject to all the other requirements of the Proposed Rule.2 11 Theoretically at least, the issuer would still
have to determine whether the institutional investor was sophisticated, and
whether it had access to the initial as well as additional information necessary
to verify the accuracy of the information received. Since the Commission
recognizes that the institutional investor does not need the protection of the
Act, it would seem that, in spite of the difficulty inherent in defining an institutional investor, the effort to do so is dictated by practical considerations.
Indeed, the First Tentative Draft of the Federal Securities Code, proposed by
Professor Loss and adopted by the American Law Institute, provides that an
offering can be made to an unlimited number of institutional investors, defined
in section 242 as:
(a) a bank, insurance company, or registered investment company, or a parent of
209. See ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 227(b) (1) (A), Comment (2)(b) (Tent. Draft No. I,
1972), wherein it is noted that the "draft goes over to the number of buyers, leaving the
number of offerees unlimited, for two reasons: because the breadth of the definition of 'offer'
makes it difficult to count offerees, and because it is difficult to see how an offeree who
does not buy is hurt." Id. (emphasis omitted).
210. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
211. Release 5,336, at 82,402.
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any such person, except to the extent that the Commission provides otherwise by rule
with respect to any such class of persons on the basis of such factors as financial
sophistication, net worth, and the amount of assets under investment management,
or (b) any other person
of a class that the Commission designates by rule on the
2 12
basis of such factors.
This definition provides broad flexibility to the Commission, which can add or
delete certain classes within the exemption, since "certain large universities,
labor unions, and self-managed state or municipal pension funds are clearly
better candidates for 'institutional investor' status than some country banks.", 1
The addition of an unambiguous and unqualified exemption for institutional
investors would facilitate the operation of Proposed Rule 146. It would eliminate
the need for the issuer to inquire into the nature, sophistication, and risk
bearing ability of the institutional investor, and would thus have the effect
of encouraging issuers in private offerings to place their securities with institutional investors who can fend for themselves and clearly do not need the
protection afforded by registration. On the other hand, where the issuer did
decide to place unregistered securities with non-institutional investors in
reliance on Proposed Rule 146, the Rule would provide definite numerical
limitations, and the inherent subjectivity of the access and sophistication standards would be fair warning that the transaction will be closely monitored
to insure adequate protection of the investor.
212. ALl Fed. Sec. Code § 242(a), (b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1972).
213. Id. Comment (2).

